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Abstract
The celebrated Becker proposition (BP) states that it is optimal to impose the
severest possible punishment (to maintain e⁄ective deterrence) at the lowest possible
probability of detection (to economize on enforcement costs). However, the BP
is not consistent with the evidence. This inconsistency is known as the Becker
paradox. In fact, the BP is a general result that applies to all low-probability events
that lead to ￿ unbounded loss￿of utility. Hence, it is applicable to a wide class of
problems in economics. We clarify the BP and its welfare implications under expected
utility, which remains the favoured framework. We argue that none of the proposed
explanations of the Becker paradox is satisfactory. We show that the BP also holds
under rank dependent expected utility and cumulative prospect theory, the two main
alternatives to expected utility. We show that composite prospect theory (CCP), of
al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010a), can resolve the Becker paradox. Our paper opens
the way for incorporating non-expected utility theories into the economic analysis of
criminal activity.
Keywords: Crime and punishment; non-linear weighting of probabilities; Cumu-
lative prospect theory; Prelec and composite Prelec probability weighting functions;
Composite prospect theory; Punishment functions.
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+44-116-2522898. Fax: +44-116-2522908. E-mail: aa10@le.ac.uk.￿Certainty of detection is far more important than severity of punishment.￿Lord Shaw-
ness (1965), Quoted from Becker (1968, footnote 12).
￿... a useful theory of criminal behavior can dispense with special theories of anomie, psy-
chological inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits and simply extend the economist￿ s
usual analysis of choice.￿Becker (1968).
￿The absence of sustained and comprehensive economic analysis of legal rules from a per-
spective informed by insights about actual human behavior makes for a signi￿cant contrast
with many other ￿elds of economics, where such ￿behavioral￿analysis has become relatively
common.￿Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (2000).
1. Introduction
In a seminal contribution, Becker (1968) opened the way to a rigorous formal economics
analysis of crime. Becker (1968) showed that the most e¢ cient way to deter a crime
is to impose the severest possible penalty with the lowest possible probability. We shall
call this the Becker proposition. The intuition is simple and compelling. By reducing the
probability of detection and conviction, society can economize on costs of enforcement such
as policing and trial costs. But by increasing the severity of the punishment (monetary
and non-monetary), the deterrence e⁄ect of the punishment is maintained.
The Becker proposition takes a particularly stark form if the decision maker follows
expected utility theory (EU) and if we add two assumptions: (1) Risk neutrality or risk
aversion. (2) The availability of in￿nitely severe (monetary and non-monetary) punish-
ments, e.g., capital punishment. With these extra assumptions, the Becker proposition
implies that crime would be deterred completely, however small the probability of detec-
tion and conviction. Kolm (1973) phrased the Becker proposition as hang o⁄enders with
probability zero.
1.1. The class of Becker paradoxes
Empirical evidence shows that the Becker proposition does not hold for all individuals.
Radelet and Ackers (1996) survey 67 of the 70 current and former presidents of three
professional criminology organizations in the USA. Over 80% of the experts believe that
existing research does not support the deterrence capabilities of capital punishment, in
contradiction to the predictions of the Becker proposition. Levitt (2004) shows that the
estimated contribution of capital punishment in deterring crime in the US over the period
1973-1991, is zero. History does not bear out the Becker proposition either. Since the
late middle ages the severity of punishments has been declining while expenditures on
enforcement have been increasing.
2Remark 1 (Becker-type punishments, Becker paradox) Consider the case where a decision
maker￿ s action results in a large loss with a small probability. We call the resulting loss
a Becker-type punishments. While Becker-type punishments might deter crime for many,
the fact that they do not do so for all is referred to as the Becker paradox.
Remark 2 (The class of Becker paradoxes): Our main focus will be on crime and punish-
ment. However, the Becker paradox is quite general. Let A be the set of all acts for which
a decision maker faces a small probability of a very large loss (Becker-type punishment).
Let e A ￿ A be the set for which EU theory predicts that the individual will be dissuaded
from such acts but observed behavior is to the contrary. Then each act in e A belongs to
the class of Becker paradoxes. Examples include not buying insurance against low prob-
ability natural hazards, jumping red tra¢ c lights, driving and talking on mobile phones,
not wearing seat belts in moving vehicles, etc.; see Section 5.1 for the details.
1.2. Failure of expected utility theory (EU)
In Section 4 we consider 9 proposed explanations for the Becker paradox, based on adding
the following auxiliary assumptions to EU. Risk seeking behavior on the part of o⁄enders,
the ability to avoid severe ￿nes by declaring bankruptcy, the need for di⁄erential punish-
ments, type-I and type-II errors in conviction, rent seeking behavior in the presence of
severe punishments, abhorrence of severe punishments, objectives other than deterrence,
including putting the welfare of o⁄enders in the social welfare function, and the psycho-
logical traits of o⁄enders. We show, in Section 5, that none of these proposed explanations
su¢ ce, singly or jointly.
Consider, for instance, the act of ￿ running a red tra¢ c light,￿a member of the class of
Becker paradoxes. In this case, the low-probability potentially fatal-punishment (which is
a Becker-type punishment) is self-in￿icted. A little re￿ ection should convince the reader
that this rules out most of the proposed explanations given for the Becker paradox, above
(see Section 5.1 for the details).
1.3. Some stylized facts on non-linear weighting of probabilities
Given the nature of the Becker paradoxes (see Remark 2), the attitudes to low probability
events are crucial. Extensive evidence suggests the following stylized facts.
S1. For probabilities in the interval [0;1], that are bounded away from the end-points,
decision makers overweight small probabilities and underweight large probabilities.1
1The evidence for stylized fact S1 is well documented and we do not pursue it further; see, for instance,
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and Starmer (2000).
3S2. For probabilities close to the endpoints of [0;1]:
S2a: A fraction ￿ 2 [0;1] of decision makers (i) ignore events of extremely low
probability and/or (ii) treat extremely high probability events as certain.2
S2b: A fraction 1 ￿ ￿ places great salience on the size of the outcomes (particularly
losses), even if the probabilities are very small or very large.
The evidence against EU is now overwhelming.3 In particular, EU does not take ac-
count of S1, S2a or S2b. By contrast, S1 is incorporated into almost all non-linear weight-
ing models, including rank dependent utility (RDU), prospect theory (PT) and cumulative
prospect theory (CP).
Non-expected utility (non-EU) theories postulate a probability weighting function, w(p) :
[0;1] ! [0;1], that captures the subjective weight placed by decision makers on the ob-
jective probability, p. Such theories, e.g., RDU and CP, account for S1 by incorporating
a w(p) function that overweights low probabilities but underweights high probabilities.
Such non-EU theories can account for S1 and S2b, but they cannot account for S2a.
A popular probability weighting function is the Prelec (1998) function: w(p) = e￿￿(￿lnp)￿
,
￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, which is parsimonious and has an axiomatic foundation. If ￿ < 1, then
this function is inverse-S-shaped. It overweights low probabilities and underweights high
probabilities, so it conforms to S1 and S2b but not S2a. All non-EU theories, particularly
RDU and CP, assume a weighting function of this form. However, for ￿ > 1 the Prelec
function is S-shaped; it is in con￿ ict with S1 and S2b but respects S2a. The two cases
￿ < 1 and ￿ > 1 are plotted below for the case ￿ = 1 and respectively ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 2.






The case ￿ < 1 (￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 1)






The case ￿ > 1 (￿ = 2, ￿ = 1)
Remark 3 : To distinguish between the two cases ￿ < 1 and ￿ > 1, we call the former
(￿ < 1) the standard Prelec function. This function becomes extremely steep as p ! 0 and




2The actual fraction ￿ could be a⁄ected by many factors; see the discussion in subsection 5.4. In the
context of buying insurance against low probability natural hazards, in one set of experiments (the urn
experiments, chapter 7), Kunreuther et al. (1978) ￿nd that ￿ = 0:8.
3See, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (2000), Starmer (2000), and Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, 2010b).
4and in￿nitely-underweights near-one probabilities in the sense that lim
p!1
1￿w(p)
1￿p = 1. Most
weighting functions in use in RDU and CP have this property. We shall call these the
standard probability weighting functions.
As compared to S1, stylized fact S2 is less well documented but no less important.
The evidence for S2 has come from three di⁄erent kinds of works. These are the bimodal
perception of risks (see Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989), prospect theory (see Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), and composite cumulative prospect theory or CCP (see al-Nowaihi and
Dhami, 2010a).4 In conjunction, this evidence is su¢ ciently important to merit a section
on its own. For that reason, we postpone this material to Section 5, below.
1.4. Failure of non-linear weighting theories to explain the Becker paradox
As pointed out in Remark 3, the main non-linear weighting models, e.g., RDU, CP, incor-
porate S1 and S2b (but not S2a). Hence, they use probability weighting functions that are
extremely steep near the origin (as in the case ￿ < 1 in Remark 3). Decision makers using
such models place very high subjective weight, w(p), on the probability, p, of facing the
Becker-type punishments. Thus, for the class of Becker paradoxes (see Remark 2) such
individuals would always be deterred by Becker-type punishments. Therefore, one would
expect that the Becker paradox would be even stronger under RDU and CP. This intuition
turns out to be correct, as we prove in Sections 7 and 8. These individuals will always be
deterred by capital punishment, will never run red tra¢ c lights, will always buy insurance
for low probability natural hazards, will never talk on mobile phones while driving, etc.
1.5. Resolution of the Becker paradoxes
In order to explain the Becker paradoxes one needs a decision theory that simultaneously
accounts for S1, S2a, S2b. There are two alternative theories that do so (see Section 5). The
￿rst is the Nobel prize winning work of Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979) prospect theory
(PT). However, PT￿ s treatment of S1, S2a, S2b, while strongly grounded in empirical
evidence, and seminal, is informal, heuristic, and can violate monotonicity even when
obvious. We discuss these issues in section 5.3.
The second theory that simultaneously accounts for S1, S2a, S2b is al-Nowaihi and
Dhami￿ s (2010a) composite cumulative prospect theory, CCP. CCP is formal, axiomatically
founded, and respects monotonicity (i.e., decision makers will not choose stochastically
dominated options). Before explaining CCP, and showing how it is able to explain the
Becker paradoxes, we shall introduce the composite Prelec probability weighting function
(CPF), which is of fundamental importance in CCP.
4We shall often abbreviate composite cumulative prospect theory to composite prospect theory.
5Figure 1.1: A composite Prelec probability weighting function (CPF).
Figure 1.1 gives the general shape of the composite Prelec probability weighting func-
tion (CPF). Let p1;p2;p3 be objective probabilities. From Figure 1.1 we see that a CPF
overweights probabilities in the range (p1;p2) and underweights probabilities in the range
(p2;p3), thus S1 holds in (p1;p3). On the other hand, the CPF underweights probabilities
in the range (0;p1) and overweights probabilities in the range (p3;1), so much so that the
CPF is almost ￿ at very near 0 and very near 1. This re￿ ects the fact that decision makers
who use a CPF ignore events of extremely low probability and treat extremely probable
events as certain. Thus S2a holds in (0;p1) [ (p3;1).
Remark 4 : Under CPF, lim
p!0w(p)=p = 0 and lim
p!1
1￿w(p)
1￿p = 0 (compare with Remark 3).
Remark 5 (CCP; al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a): Under CCP, a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the
population (see S2b) uses Tversky and Kahneman￿ s (1992) CP with its standard proba-
bility weighting function (see Remark 3). The remaining fraction ￿ (see S2a) uses CP but
replaces the standard probability weighting function with the composite Prelec probability
weighting function (CPF).
Remark 6 (CRDU; al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a) Composite rank dependent utility
(CRDU) is de￿ned analogously with rank dependent utility, RDU, replacing CP in Remark
5. We argue, however, that CCP is more satisfactory than CRDU.
Given Remarks 4, 5, 6, it follows that:
1. In each of CCP and CRDU, a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the individuals follows respectively,
CP and RDU and, so, the remarks in subsection 1.4 apply. They in￿nitely over-
weight in￿nitesimal probabilities and, thus, they avoid acts that lead to Becker-type
punishments. But then the Becker paradox remains.
62. In each of CCP and CRDU, a fraction ￿ follows respectively, CP and RDU with one
important di⁄erence. They use the CPF rather than any of the standard weighting
functions and, so, place very low subjective weights on very low probabilities (Remark
4). Hence, one might conjecture that they would not be dissuaded from acts that
lead to Becker type punishments, thus, resolving the Becker paradox. This intuition
is only partially correct because in Becker type punishments, against the ￿ very low
probability￿must be set the ￿ very high level of punishment.￿ CRDU is unable to
explain the Becker paradox while CCP can explain it.
So why is CCP successful when all other theories fail? The main reason is that
in addition to more reasonable behavior for low probabilities (in the region [0;p1]
in Figure 1.1) CCP shares other empirically important features with CP that are
absent in CRDU. In particular, the reference dependence feature of CCP turns out
to be necessary to address the problem. Due to reference points, criminals derive
elation in the state of the world where they are not caught. The higher the level of
punishment, the higher is the elation from escaping it. In conjunction with Remark
4, elation ensures that such decision makers will not be dissuaded by Becker type
punishments, hence, explaining the Becker paradox.5 These individuals may (i) not
be dissuaded by capital punishment, (ii) ignore insurance for low probability hazards,
(iii) drive and talk on mobile phones, (iv) run red tra¢ c lights, and (v) not take up
o⁄ers of free breast cancer examinations etc.
1.6. Contributions of our paper
First we show that the Becker proposition is a general result that applies to all low proba-
bility events that lead to potentially unbounded loss for the individual. Second, we clarify
the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the Becker proposition under EU and it￿ s wel-
fare consequences. Third, we show that none of the proposed explanations of the Becker
paradox is satisfactory. Fourth, we show that the Becker paradox survives under several
main alternatives to EU, speci￿cally, RDU, CP and CRDU. Fifth, we show that, so far, the
only decision theory that can explain the general class of Becker paradoxes is composite
prospect theory (CCP).
1.7. Organization of the paper
Section 2 formulates a standard economic model of crime. The Becker proposition is
considered under EU in Section 3. Potential solutions to the Becker paradox are surveyed
5We show that the solution of the Becker paradox under CCP is robust to several considerations on
reference points that have been suggested in the recent literature. These include the emphasis on rational
expectations (K￿szegi and Rabin, 2006) and state-dependent reference points (Schmidt et al., 2008).
7in Section 4. Section 5 gives more evidence for stylized fact S2 and shows that none of
the explanations proposed in Section 4, either singly or jointly, can explain the Becker
paradoxes. Section 6 gives a brief discussion of probability weighting functions which are
central to applying non-linear decision weights models (with particular emphasis on the
Prelec (1998) function). Section 7 shows that the Becker paradox re-emerges under RDU
while Section 8 shows it also re-emerges under CP. Section 9 discusses the composite Prelec
function (CPF). Section 10 gives formal de￿nitions of composite prospect theory (CCP)
and composite rank dependent utility (CRDU); it also shows that CRDU cannot explain
the Becker paradox. Section 11 shows how CCP can resolve the Becker paradox. Section
12 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The model and assumptions
Suppose that an individual receives income y0 ￿ 0 from being engaged in some legal
activity and income y1 ￿ y0 from being engaged in some illegal activity. Hence, the
bene￿t, b, from the illegal activity is
b = y1 ￿ y0 ￿ 0: (2.1)
If engaged in the illegal activity, the individual is caught with some probability p, 0 ￿ p ￿
1. If caught, the individual is asked to pay a ￿ne, F. As in the literature we interpret F
as the monetary equivalent of all punishments. We assume that,
b ￿ F ￿ Fmax ￿ 1. (2.2)
Thus, it is feasible to levy a ￿ne that is at least as great as the bene￿t from crime, b. If
Fmax < 1, then a feasible ￿ne is bounded above. If Fmax = 1, then there is no upper
bound to ￿nes. Given the enforcement parameters p, F the individual makes only one
choice: To commit the crime or not.
This minimal framework nests several important settings, for example:
Example 1 (Theft/robbery): Engaging in theft gives a monetary reward b ￿ 0. If the
thief is caught (with probability p ￿ 0) the goods, whose value is b, are impounded and,
in addition, the o⁄ender pays a ￿ne, f ￿ 0 (or faces other penalties such as imprisonment
whose equivalent monetary value is f). Hence, F = b + f.
Example 2 (Tax evasion): Consider the following widely used model (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972). A taxpayer has taxable incomes z1 > 0 and z2 > 0 from two economic
activities, both of which are taxed at the rate t > 0. Income z1 cannot be evaded (for
instance, it could be wage income with the tax withheld at source). However, the individual
8can choose to evade or declare income z2.6 It follows that y0 = (1 ￿ t)(z1 + z2). Suppose
that the taxpayer chooses to evade income z2. Hence, y1 = (1 ￿ t)z1 + z2 > y0 and the
bene￿t from tax evasion is b = tz2 ￿ 0. If caught evading, the individual is asked to pay
back the tax liabilities owed, b = tz2, and an additional ￿ne f = ￿tz2 where ￿ > 0 is the
penalty rate. Hence, F = (1 + ￿)tz2.
Example 3 (Pollution): Consider a ￿rm that produces a ￿xed output that is sold for a
pro￿t, ￿. As a by-product, and conditional on the ￿rm￿ s existing technology, the ￿rm
creates a level of emissions, E, that is greater than the legal limit, E. With probability
p ￿ 0 the ￿rm￿ s emissions are audited by the appropriate regulatory authority. Emission
can be reduced at a cost of c > 0 per unit by making changes to existing technology.








￿ 0 is the bene￿t arising










We have not speci￿ed the preferences of the individual, yet. In subsequent sections we
shall consider, sequentially, the possibilities that the decision maker has expected utility
(EU), rank dependent utility (RDU), and cumulative prospect theory (CP) preferences.
2.1. The social costs of crime and law enforcement
Let C (p;F) ￿ 0 be the cost to society of law enforcement. Also, let D(p;F) ￿ 0 be the
damage to society caused by crime. Obviously, these entities depend on p, F.
Remark 7 (Notation) : We indicate partial di⁄erentiation with subscripts. For example,
Cp = @C
@p and CpF = @2C
@p@F.
We assume that C (0;0) = 0, i.e., in the absence of any law enforcement, costs of such
enforcement are zero. We also assume that C and D are di⁄erentiable with
Cp > 0, CF ￿ 0, Dp ￿ 0, DF ￿ 0. (2.3)
Thus, the cost of law enforcement can be reduced by reducing the probability of detection
and conviction, p. In general, an increase in the punishment, F, will increase the cost of
law enforcement (for example, increasing the length of prison sentences). The damages to
society can be reduced by increasing p;F, because these act to deter crime.
We note, for future reference, a special case below.
De￿nition 1 (Ideal ￿ne): The case CF = 0 can be thought of as that of an ideal ￿ne,
which has a ￿xed administrative cost and involves a transfer from the o⁄ender to the victim
or society (so there is no aggregate loss to society other than the ￿xed administrative cost).
6Examples include income from several kinds of ￿nancial assets, domestic work, private tuition, private
rent, income from overseas, among many others. In actual practice, tax evasion often takes the form of
completely hiding certain taxable activities; see Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
92.2. Society￿ s objective
Let T (p;F) ￿ 0 be the total cost to society of crime. This is the sum of cost of law
enforcement, C (p;F), and the damages to society, D(p;F).
T (p;F) = C (p;F) + D(p;F). (2.4)
Society aims to choose the substitute instruments p and F so as to minimize T (p;F).
Both instruments aim for a common target (minimizing T (p;F)) but have di⁄erent e⁄ects
on costs and damages. We make the following assumptions on T (p;F),
[TF]F=0 < 0,[TF]F=Fmax > 0, TFF > 0, TpF > 0. (2.5)
The ￿rst condition in (2.5) ensures that total costs can be reduced by raising the ￿ne
just above zero, hence, F = 0 is not optimal. The second condition ensures that, at
F = Fmax, the costs are increasing in ￿nes, hence, it would be bene￿cial to reduce ￿nes
below Fmax. Together, they ensure that an optimal ￿ne is an interior point. The third
condition ensures that our solution is a global maximum. The fourth condition will ensure
that the two instruments, p;F are strategic substitutes (see below).
2.3. A principal-agent interpretation of the model
We can also interpret this model more generally as that of a principal-agent relationship.
A principal contracts an agent to perform a certain task in exchange for the monetary
reward y0. The agent can either carry out his task honestly or can improperly exploit
the principal￿ s facilities to enhance his income to y1 > y0. This causes damage, D, to the
principal. The principal can introduce a monitoring technology and a system of sanctions
at a cost C (p;F). The total cost to the principal is, thus, T (p;F) = C (p;F) + D(p;F),
where p is the probability of detection and F is the sanction. The analogue of Becker￿ s
proposition, in this case, is to impose the severest sanction on the agent with the minimum
probability of detection, i.e., o⁄er, what Rasmusen (1994) calls, a boiling in oil contract.
2.4. Punishment functions
The objective of minimizing T (p;F) with respect to p;F can be broken down into two
stages. First, we ask whether, for each p, there is a level of punishment, F = ’(p), that
minimizes T (p;’(p)) given p. If the existence of such an optimal punishment function is
assured, then we can ask whether there exists a probability, p, that minimizes T (p;’(p)).
Formal de￿nitions are given below. First, we de￿ne a punishment function (optimal or
otherwise), then we de￿ne an optimal punishment function.
10De￿nition 2 (Punishment function): By a punishment function we mean a function
’(p) : [0;1] ! [0;Fmax] that assigns to each probability of detection and conviction,
p 2 [0;1], a punishment ’(p) 2 [0;Fmax].7
Note that we allow for the possibility of in￿nite punishments. In particular, if Fmax =
1, then we allow for the possibility that ’(p) = 1 for some p.
Remark 8 (Notation): F = ’(p) denotes a punishment function. F = F is the special
case where the same ￿ne, F, is levied for all levels of p.
De￿nition 3 (Optimal punishment function): Let ’ : [0;1] ! [0;Fmax] be a punishment
function. We call ’ an optimal punishment function if, for all p 2 [0;1], and for all
F 2 [0;Fmax], T (p;’(p)) ￿ T (p;F).
We now give two results but omit the simple proofs.
Result 1 (Existence of optimal punishment functions; Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2010a,
Lemma 1): Optimal punishment functions exist.
De￿nition 4 (Cost and ￿ne elasticities): ￿C
p =
p
CCp is the probability elasticity of cost,
￿C
F = F





dp is the probability
elasticity of punishment.
Result 2 (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2010a, Lemma 2): d








F is most likely to hold when the costs to society do not
increase too rapidly in response to an increase in ￿nes. It will be satis￿ed for an ideal ￿ne,
since ￿C
p > 0 and ￿C
F = 0 for an ideal ￿ne (see De￿nition 1).
2.4.1. Substitutability of the instruments p;F
From Result 1, an optimal punishment function exists. Hence, given p, F = ’(p) mini-
mizes T (p;F) with respect to F. From (2.5), the optimal ￿ne F = ’(p) lies in the interior




0 (p) + TpF]F=’(p) = 0,
) ’







7In fact, ’([0;1]) ￿ [b;Fmax].
11In order to determine the sign in (2.6), we have used the strategic substitutability between
p;F, from (2.5). Thus, at the optimal solution, for a ￿xed level of crime, p;F are negatively
related, i.e., the optimal punishment function takes the form:
’(p) : [0;1] ! [0;Fmax], ’(1) = b, ’
0 (p) < 0: (2.7)
At p = 1, all criminal activity is perfectly detected and, so, deterred. Hence, ￿nes, because,
they are costly, should be set to their lowest value, so, ’(1) = b.
2.4.2. The hyperbolic punishment function and its rationale
A popular and tractable punishment function, which satis￿es all the desired restrictions
in (2.7), i.e., ’(1) = b, ’0 (p) < 0, is the hyperbolic punishment function (HPF).
De￿nition 5 (Hyperbolic punishment function, HPF): A HPF is de￿ned by
’(p) = b=p. (2.8)
The name derives from the fact that in p;F space, the HPF plots as a rectangular
hyperbola. Note that, for (2.8), ’(0) = 1. We show below that the HPF will always
deter a risk neutral or risk averse o⁄ender under expected utility theory (i.e., the Becker
proposition holds in this case under the stated assumptions).
There are several important justi￿cations for using the HPF. Using a standard model
of crime under the assumption of risk neutrality, Polinsky and Shavell (2007) show that
the HPF is an optimal punishment function. Furthermore, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2010a)
prove the following two important results. First, the HPF is optimal for wide, plausible
and sensible range of total cost functions. Second, the HPF gives an upper bound on
punishments. These are formally stated, below.
Result 3 (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2010a, Proposition 1): The HPF is optimal, whenever
the total cost function (see, (2.4)) takes the following form:




F + ￿ (p); a < 0;c > 0;￿
0 (p) > 0.
The ￿rst term can be thought of as a quadratic approximation to a more general ￿ne
function. The second term represents the strategic substitutability between p and F.
￿ (p) is any arbitrary increasing function that can be used to ￿t the data.
Result 4 (Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2010a, Proposition 2): Let ￿ be the class of optimal













where, c > 0; m > 0; !
0(p) > 0;!
0(1) < 1;!
00(p) ￿ 0;n > 0; !
0(p) > 0;mc > n;mc
2 > n.
Then the HPF is an upper bound to punishment functions is ￿.
In the cost and damage functions of Result 4, the ￿nes appear as quadratic terms and
p appears in an exponential form. Thus, the marginal e⁄ect of changes in p are steeper
than the corresponding e⁄ects of ￿nes. The critical implication of Result 4, is that if the
HPF cannot deter crime, then none of the members in ￿ can deter crime either.
3. The Becker proposition under expected utility theory (EU)
We now consider the Becker proposition under EU. Consider an individual with continu-
ously di⁄erentiable and strictly increasing utility of income, u.
If he does not engage in crime, his income is y0. In that case, his payo⁄ from no-
crime, UNC, is given by UNC = u(y0). On the other hand, if the individual engages
in crime, his income is y1 ￿ y0 if not caught, but y1 ￿ F ￿ y1, if caught. Since he
is caught with probability, p, his expected utility from crime, EUC, is given by EUC =
pu(y1 ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)u(y1). The individual does not engage in crime if the no-crime
condition (NCC) EUC ￿ UNC is satis￿ed. Thus the no-crime condition is
NCC: pu(y1 ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)u(y1) ￿ u(y0). (3.1)
Recall from (2.7) that for p = 1, F = ’(1) = b. Thus, since y1 ￿ b = y0, (3.1) is clearly
satis￿ed for p = 1. Let F = ’(p) be a di⁄erentiable function of p satisfying (2.7). The
NCC in (3.1) continues to hold, as p is declines from 1, if, and only if
d
dp
[pu(y1 ￿ ’(p)) + (1 ￿ p)u(y1)] ￿ 0. (3.2)
, u
0 (y1 ￿ ’(p)) ￿
u(y1) ￿ u(y1 ￿ ’(p))
￿p’0 (p)
. (3.3)
For the HPF (2.8),
￿p’0(p)
’(p) = 1, so the NCC, (3.3), reduces to
NCC for HPF: u
0 (y1 ￿ ’(p)) ￿
u(y1) ￿ u(y1 ￿ ’(p))
’(p)
. (3.4)
If the decision maker is risk averse or risk neutral, so that u is concave, then the NCC
(3.4) will hold for all p 2 (0;1]. We show in Proposition 1 below that (i) not only does the
Becker proposition hold for risk-neutral and risk averse criminals, (ii) its implementation
is socially desirable because it reduces the total cost of crime T (p;F) for society.
13Proposition 1 : Under EU,
(a) If the individual is risk neutral or risk averse, so that u is concave, then the HPF
’(p) = b
p will deter crime. It follows that given any probability of detection and conviction,
p > 0, no matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently large punishment.
(b) If, in addition, ￿C
p > ￿C
F (De￿nition 4), then reducing p reduces the total social cost of
crime and law enforcement, T (p;F).
While Proposition 1(a) is well known from Becker (1968), Proposition 1(b) is, as far
as we know, a new result.
Example 4 : Consider the utility function u(y) = ￿e￿y. Note that u0 (y) = e￿y > 0;
u00 (y) = ￿e￿y < 0. From the second inequality, we see that this utility function exhibits
risk averse behavior. Hence, from Proposition 1 (a) it would be possible to deter crime,
however small the probability of detection and conviction.
In contrast to these results, Levitt (2004) argues: ￿... given the rarity with which
executions are carried out in this country and the long delays in doing so, a rational
criminal should not be deterred by the threat of execution.￿ That might well be true.
However, this observation is certainly not consistent with the decision maker following
EU, under the conditions of Proposition 1. The probability of capital punishment can be
made arbitrarily small but it will certainly deter crime under EU (Becker proposition).
3.1. Risk aversion: The role of necessary and su¢ cient conditions
We now explore the role of necessity and su¢ ciency of risk attitudes for the Becker propo-
sition. The conditions in Proposition 1 are su¢ cient conditions. We ￿rst give an example
to show that the Becker proposition need not hold under risk-loving behavior.
Example 5 : Consider the utility function u(y) = ey. Note that u0 (y) = ey > 0;
u00 (y) = ey > 0. From the second inequality, we see that this utility function exhibits risk
seeking behavior. Hence, Proposition 1(a) does not apply. In fact, substituting u(y) = ey
in the NCC (3.1), and allowing in￿nitely large ￿nes, gives that crime is deterred if, and
only if, p > pmin = 1 ￿
u(y0)
u(y1) > 0. Hence, even if in￿nite punishments were available, it
would be possible to deter crime only if the probability of conviction was above a certain
minimum. Thus, the Becker proposition need not hold in the case of risk seeking behavior.
The following two examples show that the conditions of Proposition 1(a), although
su¢ cient, are not necessary.
14Example 6 : Consider the utility function u(y) = lny. Then, it follows from the NCC
(3.1), that the probability of detection and conviction, p > 0, can be made arbitrarily
low, by choosing the ￿xed punishment F = F = y1. Hence, the HPF, F = ’(p) = b
p, is
su¢ cient, but not necessary to deter crime.
Example 7 : Consider the following utility function used by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) and supported by a large body of experimental work.
u(y) =
￿
y￿ if y ￿ 0
￿(￿y)
￿ if y < 0
; 0 < ￿ < 1. (3.5)
This utility function is (strictly) concave for y ￿ 0 but strictly convex for y < 0. Zero is
the reference point in this case. Hence, we have risk seeking behavior in the region y < 0.
In this case, the NCC, (3.1), holds for any p 2 (0;1], if the punishment function is given










. However, the elasticity of ￿ne






y1 + q (y1;y0)
! 1 as p ! 0:
Since the NCC holds and crime is deterred, so D(p;F) = 0, therefore, T(p;F) = C(p;F).
Hence, it would be socially bene￿cial to drive the probability of detection and conviction
down to zero if ideal ￿nes (￿C
F = 0) were available or if ￿C
p ! 1 faster than ￿F
p ￿C
F (see
Lemma 2). Thus, risk seeking behavior is not su¢ cient to explain the Becker paradox.
4. The competing explanations of the Becker paradox
The Becker paradox arises when observed behavior is contrary to the Becker proposition.
Considerable e⁄ort has gone into explaining the Becker paradox. We ￿rst critically discuss
these explanations. Section 5.1 then argues that these explanations are insu¢ cient, singly
or jointly, to explain the general class of Becker paradoxes (see Remark 2).
1. Risk seeking behavior: If decision makers are risk-seekers (compare Examples 4 and
5, above) then the Becker proposition need not hold. This potential explanation is
given in Becker (1968). However, this explanation creates great di¢ culties for other
explanations of human behavior that require some form of risk aversion, e.g., insur-
ance, investment, saving, risk management, principal-agent theory and mechanism
design. Moreover, risk-seeking behavior is not su¢ cient, as shown by Example 7.
2. Bankruptcy issues: Bankruptcy issues put an upper bound on the level of possible
￿nes.8 There are several objections to this explanation. First, it takes ￿nes literally
8See, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (1991) and Garoupa (2001).
15rather than the more general interpretation as the monetary equivalent of punish-
ment. Second, even when interpreted literally, ￿nes can be backed up by other
punishments such as imprisonment (which is currently the case) or penal slavery
(which used to be the case) for those (and their descendants) unwilling or unable to
pay the ￿ne. Third, the historic trend has been to limit the consequences of declaring
bankruptcy, e.g., the emergence of the limited company; see Friedman (1999).
3. Di⁄erential punishments: The argument for a system of di⁄erential punishments is
unassailable. However, it does not explain why the whole portfolio of punishments
cannot be made more severe while maintaining di⁄erentiation. For example, we could
combine imprisonment and capital punishment with various degrees of torture. In
fact, the historic trend is to make prisons (and capital punishment, where it still
remains) more humane. See Polinsky and Shavell (2000b) for a discussion.
4. Errors in conviction: To our minds, this is one of the two most persuasive expla-
nations (the other is rent seeking behavior). The penal system may fail to convict
an o⁄ender (a type I error), or might falsely convict an innocent person (a type
II error).9 The possibility of falsely convicting an innocent person causes a loss to
society. Unboundedly, severe punishments then cause potentially unbounded losses
to society. This destroys one of the fundamental assumptions of the economic model
of crime, i.e., increasing p is more costly to society than increasing F; see Polinsky
and Shavell (2000b).
5. Rent seeking behavior: The possibility of a false conviction and the availability of out
of court settlements, encourages malicious accusations. This temptation increases
with increasing F, thus undermining the basic assumption that increasing F is less
costly than increasing p. The possibility of failing to convict an o⁄ender encourages
payments by o⁄enders to lawyers to defend them or (even worse) to pay police (and
other monitoring authorities) to ￿ turn a blind eye￿ . Again this possibility undermines
the assumption that increasing F is less costly to society than increasing p; see, for
instance, Friedman (1999). Explanations 4 and 5 seem persuasive but fail for the
general class of Becker paradoxes; see section 5.1, below.
6. Abhorrence of severe punishments: Society may not, for reasons of norms, fairness
etc., accept severe punishments.10 This provides a strong potential explanation for
the Becker paradox, but leaves open the question of an explanation of these norms.
However, our focus is on examining the purely economic case for the Becker paradox.
9See, for instance, Andreoni (1991) and Feess and Wholschlegel (2009).
10For a model in which preferences for fairness ensure that ￿nes are bounded away from their upper
bound, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000a).
16This explanation, like most others in this section is found wanting when we consider
the general class of Becker paradoxes in section 5.1, below.
7. Objectives other than deterrence: Punishment might have objectives other than de-
terrence, e.g., incapacitation and retribution. Incapacitation is easily incorporated
into an economic model of crime because it has measurable monetary bene￿ts and
costs. It may be possible to give an evolutionary-economic explanation to the emer-
gence of the desire by individuals for retribution. Such a desire would clearly help
law enforcement, so would be bene￿cial to society and, hence, to its members.
8. Risk aversion with bounded punishments: Suppose that criminals are risk averse and
di⁄er in their bene￿ts, b, from crime. Consider an increase in ￿nes. On the one hand,
the imposition of the ￿ne acts as a deterrent for some individuals (depending on their
level of b). But on the other hand, for those who are not deterred, an increase in ￿nes
reduces the risk-averse criminals￿income, if caught. If the utility of all citizens enters
the social welfare function, then ￿nes have opposing e⁄ects, leading to an interior
solution where these marginal e⁄ects balance out.11
9. Pathological traits of o⁄enders: Colman (1995) shows how the persistence of ￿ criminal
types￿(the most notorious being psychopaths) can be part of an evolutionary stable
Nash equilibrium. These individuals are predisposed to commit crime irrespective of
the enforcement parameters p;F. Although this explains why the Becker proposition
fails when applied to the most heinous crimes, it does not explain other members in
the general class of Becker paradoxes; see section 5.1, below.
5. Evidence for S2 and an assessment of the proposed explanations
for the Becker paradox
In subsection 5.1, below, we evaluate the explanations in Section 4 with two further ob-
jectives. (i) To provide more evidence for S2, particularly S2a. (ii) To introduce several
members of the general class of Becker paradoxes (see Remark 2). We then turn, in subsec-
tion 5.2, to the evidence on S2 from the bimodal perception of risks model. Kahneman and
Tversky￿ s (1979) evaluation of the evidence on S2, and their proposed theoretical solution
is discussed in section 5.3. The determinants of ￿, the fraction which respects S2a, are
discussed in section 5.4.
11This expanation is due to Polinsky and Shavell (1979) and Kaplow (1992) but it is subsumed within
our point 6, abhorrence of severe punishments, above.
175.1. Why might the explanations in Section 4 not su¢ ce?
We now argue that the explanations in section 4, either singly or in conjunction, cannot
explain the general class of Becker paradoxes (see Remark 2).
5.1.1. Evidence from jumping red tra¢ c lights
Consider an individual act of running red lights. There is (at least) a small probability of an
accident. However, the consequences (F in our framework) are self-in￿icted and potentially
have in￿nite costs. Hence, this belongs to the general class of Becker paradoxes.
Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2001, 2004) estimate that there are approximately 260,000
accidents per year in the USA caused by red-light running with implied costs of car repair
alone of the order of $520 million per year. Clearly, this is an activity of economic signi￿-
cance and it is implausible to assume that running red tra¢ c lights are simply ￿ mistakes￿ .
Bar-Ilan (2000) and Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2001, 2004) provide, what is to our minds,
near decisive evidence that the explanations in subsection 4 cannot provide a satisfactory
explanation of the Becker paradox within an EU framework.
Using Israeli data, Bar-Ilan (2000) calculated that the expected gain from jumping one
red tra¢ c is, at most, one minute (the length of a typical light cycle). Given the known
probabilities he ￿nds that if a slight injury causes a loss greater or equal to 0.9 days, a risk
neutral person will be deterred by that risk alone. But, the corresponding numbers for
the additional risks of serious and fatal injuries are 13.9 days and 69.4 days respectively
(which should deter red tra¢ c light running completely).12
Clearly EU combined with risk aversion would ￿nd it di¢ cult to explain this evidence.
Explanations 2-8 in section 4 do not apply here, because the punishment is self in￿icted.13
Explanation 9 is also inadequate, for Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote (2004) report ￿We ￿nd that
red-light running decreases sharply in response to an increase in the ￿ne ... Criminals
convicted of violent o⁄ences or property o⁄ences run more red lights on average but have
the same elasticity as drivers without a criminal record￿ . This leaves explanation 1, i.e.,
risk seeking, but we have already noted the problems with it in Section 4.
5.1.2. Driving while talking on hand-held mobile phones
Consider the usage of hand-held mobile phones in moving vehicles. A user of mobile phones
faces potentially in￿nite punishment (e.g., loss of one￿ s and/or the family￿ s life) with low
12To these, should be added the time lost due to police involvement, time and money lost due to auto-
repairs, court appearances, ￿nes, increase in car-insurance premiums and the cost and pain of injury and
death.
13For instance, one cannot argue along the lines of Explanation 6 that there are any norms or fairness
considerations involved in jumping red tra¢ c lights.
18probability, in the event of an accident.14 This too belongs to the general class of Becker
paradoxes. The Becker proposition applied to this situation suggests that drivers will not
use mobile phones while driving. But evidence is to the contrary.
Various survey evidence in the UK indicates that up to 40 percent of individuals drive
and talk on mobile phones; see, for example, the RSPA (2005). P￿ystia et al. (2005)
report that two thirds of Finnish drivers and 85% of American drivers use their phone
while driving, which increases the risk of an accident by two to six fold.15
5.1.3. Purchase of insurance for natural hazards
Consider individual choice to buy non-mandatory insurance against low probability but
high-cost natural hazards (e.g., earthquake, ￿ ood and hurricane damage in areas prone to
these hazards). This is yet another member of the general class of Becker paradoxes. The
Becker proposition would suggest that if decision makers use expected utility then they
should buy at least some insurance, even if it is actuarially unfair. This applies with even
greater bite as the probability becomes smaller and the size of the loss becomes larger.16
By contrast, based on extensive ￿eld and lab evidence, Kunreuther et al. (1978) found
that there is a probability below which the take-up of insurance drops dramatically. These
results were robust to a very large number of controls, perturbations and other relevant
factors; see al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010b) for the details. Kunreuther et al. (1978, p.
238) write: ￿Based on these results, we hypothesize that most homeowners in hazard-
prone areas have not even considered how they would recover should they su⁄er ￿ ood or
earthquake damage. Rather they treat such events as having a probability of occurrence
su¢ ciently low to permit them to ignore the consequences [as in S2a].￿ This evidence
contradicts the Becker proposition. Furthermore, none of the explanations in section 4
provide a satisfactory resolution.17
14Extensive evidence suggests that the perceived probability of an accident might be even lower than the
actual probability because drivers are overcon￿dent of their driving abilities. Taylor and Brown (1998)
suggest that upto 90 percent of car accidents might be caused by overcon￿dence. The overcon￿dence
￿nding is pervasive in behavioral economics and arises from many diverse contexts. In each case, the
individual￿ s perceived probability of a loss is lower than the actual probability, which further strengthens
our argument for the general class of Becker paradoxes.
15Hands-free equipment, although now obligatory in many countries, seems not to o⁄er essential safety
advantages. This suggests that it is the mental distraction that is dangerous, rather than the physical act
of holding a mobile phone.
16For formal proofs of these claims, see al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010b).
17For the literature that extends the original work of Kunreuther et al (1978), see al-Nowaihi and Dhami
(2010b). Recent evidence suggests that some individuals overinsure for modest risks; see Sydnor (2010).
Under composite prospect theory (CCP) this can be accomodated because the evidence indicates that a
fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the individuals respect S2(b) (these conform to the evidence in Sydnor, 2010), while the
remaining fraction, ￿, respects S2(a) (these conform to the evidence in Kunreuther et al, 1978).
195.1.4. Breast cancer examination
Consider the decision to have a breast cancer examination before the recent spread of
awareness a few decades ago. Breast cancer has a low unconditional probability but po-
tentially in￿nite private cost (Becker-type punishment).18 Hence, this decision quali￿es it
to be a member of the general class of Becker paradoxes. The unconditional probability
of breast cancer was perceived to be even lower prior to the recent ris in awareness. Even
as evidence accumulated about the dangers of breast cancer, women took up the o⁄er of
breast cancer examination, only sparingly.19 This clearly runs counter to the predictions
of the Becker proposition which would suggest that all women should have over-subscribed
to the non-mandatory examination. The suggested explanations of the Becker paradox in
section 4 do not seem to o⁄er a satisfactory solution.
5.2. The bimodal perception of risk
There is strong evidence of a bimodal perception of risks, see Camerer and Kunreuther
(1989) and Schade et al. (2001) that directly supports S2. A fraction ￿ of individuals do
not pay attention to losses whose probability falls below a certain threshold (as in S2a).
For the remaining fraction 1￿￿ of individuals, the size of the loss is relatively more salient
despite the low probability (as in S2b).
McClelland et al. (1993) ￿nd strong evidence of a bimodal perception of risks for
insurance for low probability events. The evidence indicates that decision makers have
a threshold below which they underestimate risk and above which they overestimate it.
Furthermore, individuals have di⁄erent thresholds. Across any population of individuals,
for any given probability one would then observe a bimodal perception of risks; see Viscusi
(1998). Kunreuther et al. (1988) argue that the bimodal response to low probability events
is observed in most ￿eld studies. This line of work, that we have only brie￿ y reviewed,
provides strong evidence for S2.
5.3. The prospect theory approach to modelling S1, S2a, S2b
Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979) Noble prize winning work on prospect theory, PT, is the
only theoretical attempt at incorporating S1, S2. PT makes a distinction between an
editing and an evaluation phase. From our perspective, the most important aspect of the
editing phase takes place when decision makers decide which improbable events to treat
18We know now from recent research in genetics that the conditional probability, conditional on a close
female relative having had the disease is much higher.
19In the US, this changed after the greatly publicized events of the mastectomies of Betty Ford and
Happy Rockefeller; see Kunreuther et al. (1978, p. xiii, p. 13-14).
20as impossible and which probable events to treat as certain.20 Under PT, decision makers




where u(xi) is the utility of xi and ￿(pi) is the associated decision weight. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) drew ￿(p) as in Figure 5.1, which is unde￿ned at both ends, re￿ ecting the
vexed issue of how decision makers behave over these ranges of probabilities.
Figure 5.1: Ignorance at the endpoints. Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 283)
Kahneman and Tversky (1979, pp.282-283) wrote the following to summarize the ev-
idence for S2, which is worth reading carefully and in full. ￿The sharp drops or apparent
discontinuities of ￿(p) at the end-points are consistent with the notion that there is a limit
to how small a decision weight can be attached to an event, if it is given any weight at all.
A similar quantum of doubt could impose an upper limit on any decision weight that is
less than unity...the simpli￿cation of prospects can lead the individual to discard events of
extremely low probability and to treat events of extremely high probability as if they were
certain. Because people are limited in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme
probabilities, highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the di⁄erence
between high probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated. Consequently ￿(p)
is not well-behaved near the end-points.￿
In Kahneman and Tversky￿ s words, low probability events are either ignored (S2a) or
overweighted (S2b). After the prospects are ￿ psychologically cleaned￿in this editing phase,
the decision maker then applies (5.1) in the evaluation phase.
Remark 9 (Problems with PT): Under PT, ￿(p) uses point transformations of probabili-
ties which can violate monotonicity21. Furthermore, ￿(p) is not de￿ned at the endpoints.
20Kahneman and Tversky (1979) also identify other heuristics in the editing phase, e.g., the isolation ef-
fect. This allows decision makers to cancel ￿ nearly common￿components of two prospects before evaluating
them.
21See Quiggin (1982) and Starmer (2000).
21Hence, one cannot apply cumulative transformations of probability suggested by Quiggin
(1982, 1993) in rank dependent utility (RDU) to deal with the monotonicity problem.
Quiggen￿ s machinery now lies at the heart of most modern non-linear weights theories.
Also, while PT can simultaneously incorporate S1, S2a, S2b, it does so in an informal
manner that is often di¢ cult to apply.
Remark 10 (Cumulative prospect theory, CP): In response to the problems in Remark 9,
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) incorporated Quiggin￿ s (1982, 1993) insights by modifying
PT to cumulative prospect theory (CP). To do so, they needed a decision weights function,
￿, that is de￿ned for the entire probability domain [0;1] (unlike the case shown in Figure
5.1). This meant eliminating the psychologically rich editing phase, which by incorporating
S2a created the gaps at the end-points. However, (and in conjunction with the standard
probability weighting functions under CP; see Remark 3) this implies that under CP, S2a
cannot be taken into account.
Remark 11 (Composite cumulative prospect theory, CCP): Remarks 9 and 10 provide
the motivation behind al-Nowaihi and Dhami￿ s (2010a) composite cumulative prospect the-
ory (CCP). Like PT, CCP incorporates S1, S2a, S2b but, unlike PT, it does so in a formal
manner that is axiomatically founded and consistent with the evidence. Also like CP, CCP
does not violate monotonicity.
5.4. Determinants of ￿, the fraction which respects S2a
The bimodal perception of risks framework, PT, and the general class of Becker paradoxes
do not specify the respective fractions, ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿ of decision makers, i.e., those who
follow respectively S2a and S2b. These fractions are likely to depend on the context and the
problem. We believe that the salience of low-probability large-outcomes, particularly losses
(and so the size of ￿) can be in￿ uenced by the media, family, friends, and public policy. For
instance, as discussed in section 5.1.4, the ￿ low-take up of free breast cancer examination￿
rose phenomenally in the US after the greatly publicized mastectomies of Betty Ford and
Happy Rockefeller in the media. Vivid public warnings of the fatal consequences of running
red tra¢ c lights and speeding (as in the UK) can have a similar e⁄ect.
The size of ￿ can also be in￿ uenced by other factors such as emotions, experience, time
available to make a decision, bounded rationality, framing, incentive e⁄ects and so on. We
take an agnostic position as to the source of ￿. For our purposes we shall simply take ￿ as
given. For ￿ = 0 our theory reduces to CP. However, the evidence strongly suggests that
(1) ￿ > 0, and (2) the size of ￿ is signi￿cant in many relevant contexts.
226. Probability weighting functions (PWF)
In all non-linear weights models (e.g. RDU and CP), the individual uses a probability
weighting function (PWF), denoted by w(p), that transforms objective probabilities, p.
De￿nition 6 : A PWF is a strictly increasing function w : [0;1]
onto ￿! [0;1].
Result 5 (al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a, Proposition 1): A PWF, w(p), has the following
properties: (a) w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1. (b) w has a unique inverse, w￿1, and w￿1 is also a
strictly increasing function from [0;1] onto [0;1]. (c) w and w￿1 are continuous.
Since the Becker proposition hinges critically on the behavior of decision makers as
p ! 0, we now o⁄er some de￿nitions that establish the relevant terminology.




1. This is the sense in which a PWF is extremely steep as p ! 0.
De￿nition 8 (Standard probability weighting functions): We shall call the entire class of
probability weighting functions that satisfy De￿nition 7, for empirically relevant values of
￿, the class of standard probability weighting functions.
Some examples of standard probability weighting functions are Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Lattimore, Baker and Witte (1992) and Prelec (1998) (for
￿ < 1; see subsection 6.1 below). These functions satisfy S1, S2b but, crucially, not S2a.
To account for S2a, it will be necessary for a PWF to satisfy the condition of De￿nition
9, below, for empirically relevant values of ￿ (recall section 1.5 in the introduction).




6.1. Prelec￿ s probability weighting function
The Prelec (1998) PWF is parsimonious, consistent with S1, S2b, and has an axiomatic
foundation. For these reasons we choose the Prelec function, but our observations apply
to all standard probability weighting functions used in RDU and CP.
De￿nition 10 (Prelec, 1998): By the Prelec function we mean the PWF w : [0;1]
onto ￿!
[0;1] given by w(0) = 0, and
w(p) = e
￿￿(￿lnp)￿
, 0 < p ￿ 1, ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0. (6.1)
We now make a distinction between the Prelec function and the standard Prelec func-
tion; Prelec (1998) prefers the later for reasons we specify below.
23De￿nition 11 (Standard Prelec function): By the standard Prelec PWF we mean the
Prelec function, de￿ned in De￿nition 10, but with 0 < ￿ < 1.
A simple proof that we omit gives the following result.
Result 6 (al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a, Proposition 3): The Prelec function (De￿nition
10) is a PWF in the sense of De￿nition 6.
For ￿ < 1 the Prelec function is strictly concave for low probabilities but strictly convex
for high probabilities, i.e., it is inverse-S shaped as in w(p) = e￿(￿lnp)
1
2(￿ = 1
2, ￿ = 1),
sketched in subsection 1.3, above. Conversely, for ￿ > 1 the Prelec function is strictly
convex for low probabilities but strictly concave for high probabilities, i.e., it is S shaped,
as in w(p) = e￿(￿lnp)2
(￿ = 2, ￿ = 1), sketched in subsection 1.3, above. Clearly, for ￿ < 1
the Prelec function is consistent with S1 but not S2a. Conversely, for ￿ > 1 the Prelec
function is consistent with S2a but not S1.
Recall De￿nitions 10 and 11. Prelec￿ s (1998) own preference is for the standard Prelec
function in De￿nition 11. According to Prelec (1998, p.505), the in￿nite limit in De￿nition
7 capture the qualitative change as we move from improbability to impossibility. However,
the standard Prelec function contradicts stylized fact S2a, i.e., the observed behavior that
people ignore events of very low probability; see, e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979). A
related and useful result, whose proof we omit, is the following.
Result 7 (al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a, Proposition 7):
(a) If ￿ < 1 then, for all ￿ > 0, the Prelec function (De￿nition 10) in￿nitely overweights




(b), If ￿ > 1 then, for all ￿ > 0, the Prelec function zero-underweights in￿nitesimal




7. The Becker paradox under rank dependent utility
Rank dependent utility (RDU) is a very conservative extension of expected utility (EU).
The objective function under RDU is succinctly described in De￿nition 12, below.
De￿nition 12 (Quiggin 1982) Consider the lottery (x1;x2;:::;xn; p1;p2;:::;pn) that pays
xi with probability pi, where x1 < x2 < ::: < xn. For RDU, the decision weights, ￿j, are










, where w(:) is a standard probability weighting
function (see de￿nition 8).22 The decision maker￿ s RDU is
U (x1;x2;:::;xn; p1;p2;:::;pn) = ￿
n
j=1￿ju(xj). (7.1)
22It can be shown that these cumulative transformations of probability ensure that stochastically dom-
inated choices are not made by the decision maker; see Quiggin (1982, 1993).
24Machina (2008) describes RDU as the most popular alternative to EU. Since RDU uses
standard probability weighting functions (De￿nition 8) it explain S1 but not S2a.
Consider the model of crime in Section 2 and let the decision maker uses RDU. Using
De￿nition 12, the payo⁄ from no-crime is UNC = u(y0), while that from crime is
EUC = [1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u(y1 ￿ F) + w(1 ￿ p)u(y1). (7.2)
Hence, the no-crime condition (NCC), EUC ￿ UNC, gives
[1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u(y1 ￿ F) + w(1 ￿ p)u(y1) ￿ u(y0). (7.3)
After some simple algebra, the NCC (7.3) becomes











Since Fmax is the maximum ￿ne, the corresponding utility is umin = u(y1 ￿ Fmax). Let











Then, from (7.4), (7.5), the NCC becomes
p ￿ pmin. (7.6)
Proposition 2 : Under RDU, if the utility function is unbounded below, then for any
probability of punishment p > 0, no matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ -
ciently severe punishment, F.
Proposition 3, below, the main result of this section, holds for any weighting function
w(p), standard (De￿nition 8) or otherwise.
Proposition 3 : Under RDU and for any PWF w(p),
(a) If the utility function, u, is concave, then, given any p > 0, no matter how small, crime
is deterred by choosing the punishment function ’(p) = b
1￿w(1￿p).




F (De￿nition 4 and Result 2), then reducing p reduces
the total social cost of crime and law enforcement, T (p;F).
So, under RDU, the Becker proposition survives and the Becker paradox remains.
258. Cumulative prospect theory (CP) and ￿xed reference points
We ￿rst outline cumulative prospect theory (CP). Consider a lottery of the form
L = (y￿m;y￿m+1;:::;y￿1;y0;y1;:::;yn;p￿m;p￿m+1;:::;p￿1;p0;p1;:::;pn),
where y￿m < ::: < y0 < ::: < yn are the outcomes and p￿m;:::;pn are the corresponding
probabilities, such that
Pn
i=￿m pi = 1 and pi ￿ 0. In CP, decision makers derive utility
from wealth relative to a reference point for wealth, y0.23
De￿nition 13 (Lotteries in incremental form or ￿ prospects￿ ) Let xi = yi￿y0;i = ￿m;:::;n
be the increment in wealth relative to y0 when the outcome is yi and x￿m < ::: < x0 =
0 < ::: < xn. Then, a lottery in incremental form (or a prospect) is:
L = (x￿m;:::;x￿1;x0;x1;:::;xn;p￿m;:::;p￿1;p0;p1;:::;pn). (8.1)
Denote by LP the set of all prospects of the form given in (8.1).
Remark 12 : An outcome is in the domain of gains if xi > 0 and in the domain of losses
if xi < 0.
De￿nition 14 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). A utility function, v(x), under CP is a
continuous, strictly increasing, mapping v : R ! R that satis￿es:
1. v (0) = 0 (reference dependence).
2. v (x) is concave for x ￿ 0 (declining sensitivity for gains).
3. v (x) is convex for x ￿ 0 (declining sensitivity for losses).24
4. ￿v (￿x) > v (x) for x > 0 (loss aversion, i.e., losses bite more than equivalent gains).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose the following utility function:
v (x) =
￿
x￿ if x ￿ 0
￿￿(￿x)
￿ if x < 0 (8.2)
where ￿;￿;￿ are constants. The coe¢ cients of the power function satisfy 0 < ￿ < 1,
0 < ￿ < 1. ￿ > 1 is known as the coe¢ cient of loss aversion.25
23y0 could be initial wealth, status-quo wealth, average wealth, desired wealth, rational expectations
of future wealth etc. depending on the context. See Kahneman and Tversky (2000), K￿szegi and Rabin
(2006), and Schmidt et al. (2008).
24Concavity in the domain of gains and convexity in the domain of losses does not mean, however, that
the decision maker is risk averse in the domian of gains and risk seeking in the domian of losses. The
reason is that attitudes to risk are also in￿ uenced by the shape of the probability weighting function. See,
for instance, the four-fold classi￿cation of risk outlined in Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
25Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assert (but do not prove) that the axiom of preference homogeneity
((x;p) ￿ y ) (kx;p) ￿ ky) generates the value function in (8.2). al-Nowaihi et al. (2008) give a formal
proof, as well as some other results (e.g. that ￿ is necessarily identical to ￿). Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) estimated that ￿ ’ ￿ ’ 0:88 and ￿ ’ 2:25.
26De￿nition 15 : For CP, the decision weights, ￿i, are de￿ned as follows. In the domain























, j = ￿m;:::;￿1.26 As in RDU, w(:) is a standard
probability weighting function (see De￿nition 8)
A decision maker using CP maximizes the following value function de￿ned over LP,
V (L) = ￿
n
i=￿m￿iv (xi); L 2 LP. (8.3)
Remark 13 : Since CP (like RDU) uses standard probability weighting functions (e.g.
the standard Prelec function with ￿ < 1), thus, using Result 7a, lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1. It follows
that, like RDU, CP can address S1 and S2b but not S2a which is necessary to resolve the
general class of Becker paradoxes.
Let the reference incomes for crime and no-crime, be respectively, yc and ync, which are
assumed to be ￿xed in this section.27 Then, using reference dependence, the payo⁄ from
not committing crime is
VNC = v (y0 ￿ ync). (8.4)
From Remark 12, the outcomes under CP are split into the domain of gains and loss.
We make the sensible assumption that the decision maker who commits a crime is in the
domain of gains if ￿ not caught￿and in the domain of losses if ￿ caught￿ . Thus, if ￿ caught￿
(with probability p), the outcome, y1￿F, is in the domain of losses (i.e., y1￿F ￿yc < 0).
If ￿ not caught￿(with probability 1 ￿ p), the outcome, y1, is in the domain of gains (i.e.,
y1 ￿ yc > 0). Thus, we have one outcome each in the domain of losses and gains.28 Using
De￿nition 15, the respective decision weights are w(p) and w(1 ￿ p).29 Then, under CP,
the individual￿ s payo⁄ from committing a crime is given by
VC = w(p)v (y1 ￿ F ￿ yc) + w(1 ￿ p)v(y1 ￿ yc): (8.5)
26We could have di⁄erent weighting functions for the domain of gains and losses, respectively, w+ (p)
and w￿ (p). However, we make the empirically founded assumption that w+ (p) = w￿ (p); see Prelec
(1998).
27In the original version of CP, in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the reference point is ￿xed. In their
third generation prospect theory, denoted by PT3, Schmidt et al (2008) suggest using state-dependent
reference points. However, the model by Schmidt et al (2008) relies on reference dependent subjective
expected utility of Sugden (2003) and so PT3 is linear in probabilities (as is, of course, EU). Thus, PT3
cannot address stylized facts S1 and S2. For that reason we do not follow PT3, but we exploit it￿ s insight
of using state dependent reference points.
28In the context of tax evasion, Example 2, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, 2010b), show that the legal
after-tax income is the unique reference point such that for all levels of declared income, the taxpayer is
in the domain of loss if caught and in the domain of gains if not caught.
29In the special case of one outcome each in the domain of gains and losses, point transformations of
probabilities coincide with cumulative transformations.
27De￿nition 16 (Elation): We shall refer to v(y1 ￿ yc) as the elation from committing a
crime and getting away with it.
The ￿ no crime condition￿(NCC) is VC ￿ VNC, which implies that
w(p)v (y1 ￿ F ￿ yc) + w(1 ￿ p)v(y1 ￿ yc) ￿ v (y0 ￿ ync). (8.6)
The NCC depends on the two reference points, ync and yc, assumed ￿xed in this section.
Section 11 considers alternative speci￿cations of reference incomes.30 Recall from Remark
8 that punishment could be ￿xed, F = F, or variable, F = ’(p). We consider the former
case here; the latter case is considered in section 11 below.
Proposition 4 : Assume ￿xed reference points ync, yc, ￿xed punishments F = F 2
[0;1), and a general utility function v that is unbounded below. Then, under CP, crime
can be deterred with arbitrarily low p, i.e., the Becker proposition holds.
Under the conditions of Proposition 4, the Becker paradox emerges under CP.
9. The composite Prelec function (CPF)
From subsection 6.1, the standard probability weighting functions either violate S1 or S2a.
This subsection outlines the composite Prelec function (CPF) of al-Nowaihi and Dhami
(2010a) which simultaneously accounts for S1, S2a. In conjunction with the feature of
reference points in CP, it will enable us to address the Becker paradox.31
The CPF in Figure 1.1 is composed of three segments of the Prelec function, respec-
















De￿nition 17 (Composite Prelec weighting function, CPF): By the CPF we mean the





0 if p = 0
e￿￿0(￿lnp)￿0 if 0 < p ￿ p
e￿￿(￿lnp)￿
if p < p ￿ p
e￿￿1(￿lnp)￿1 if p < p ￿ 1
(9.2)
where p and p are given by (9.1) and
0 < ￿ < 1, ￿ > 0; ￿0 > 1, ￿0 > 0; ￿1 > 1, ￿1 > 0;￿0 < 1=￿
￿0￿1
1￿￿ , ￿1 > 1=￿
￿1￿1
1￿￿ . (9.3)
30These include the state-dependent reference point speci￿cation of Schmidt et al (2008) as well as the
state-independent-rational-expectations speci￿cation of K￿szegi and Rabin (2006).
31This combination can also potentially address the other problems outlined in section 5.1. See, for
instance, al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010a,b).
28Result 8 (al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a, Proposition 8): The CPF (De￿nition 17) is a
PWF in the sense of De￿nition 6.
The restrictions ￿ > 0, ￿ > 0, ￿0 > 0 and ￿1 > 0, in (9.3), are required by the
axiomatic derivations of the Prelec function (see Prelec (1998), Luce (2001) and al-Nowaihi
and Dhami (2006)). The restrictions ￿0 < 1=￿
￿0￿1
1￿￿ and ￿1 > 1=￿
￿1￿1





is not empty. The interval limits are chosen so that the CPF in (9.2)
is continuous across them. These observations lead to the following proposition. First,






















Result 9 (al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a, Proposition 9): (a) p1 < p < p2 < p < p3. (b)
p 2 (0;p1) ) w(p) < p. (c) p 2 (p1;p2) ) w(p) > p. (d) p 2 (p2;p3) ) w(p) < p. (e)
p 2 (p3;1) ) w(p) > p.
By Result 8, the CPF in (9.2), (9.3) is a PWF in the sense of De￿nition 6. It will
be helpful to bear in mind Figure 1.1 at this stage. By Result 9, a CPF overweights
low probabilities, i.e., those in the range (p1;p2), and underweights high probabilities, i.e.,
those in the range (p2;p3). Thus it accounts for stylized fact S1. But, in addition, and
unlike all the standard probability weighting functions, it underweights probabilities near
zero, i.e., those in the range (0;p1), and overweights probabilities close to one, i.e., those in
the range (p3;1), as required in the narrative of Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 282-83)
in subsection 5.3. Hence, a CPF also accounts for S2a.
The restrictions ￿0 > 1 and ￿1 > 1 in (9.3) ensure that a CPF has the following
properties, that help explain human behavior for extremely low probability events.
Result 10 (al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a, Proposition 10c): Since for the ￿rst segment
of the CPF, ￿0 > 1, hence, using Result 7(b) we get that for all ￿ > 0, a CPF, zero-




al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010a) provide the axiomatic foundations for the CPF, which
the interested reader can pursue. They relies on a modi￿cation of their axiom of power
invariance that they used in al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006) to axiomatically derive the
Prelec probability weighting function. Their new axiom is called local power invariance.32
32Local power invariance is de￿ned as follows. Let 0 = p0 < p1 < ::: < pn = 1. A probability weighting
function, w, satis￿es local power invariance if, for i = 1;2;:::;n, w is C1 on (pi￿1;pi) and 8p;q 2 (pi￿1;pi),
(wi (p))








. The al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010a)
axioms can also be directly imposed on lotteries.
299.1. An example of a composite Prelec function
Kunreuther et al. (1978, ch.7) report that the take-up of actuarially fair insurance begins
to decline if the probability of the loss goes below 0:05. al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010b)






, i:e:, ￿ = 2;￿ = 0:19286 if 0 < p < 0:05
e￿(￿lnp)
1
2, i:e:, ￿ = 0:5;￿ = 1 if 0:05 ￿ p ￿ 0:95
e￿86:081(￿lnp)2
, i:e:, ￿ = 2;￿ = 86:081 if 0:95 < p ￿ 1
(9.5)






Figure 9.1: The composite Prelec function.
Comparing (9.2) with (9.5) we see that p = 0:05 and p = 0:95. For 0 ￿ p < 0:05, the
CPF is identical to the S-shaped Prelec function, e￿￿0(￿lnp)￿0, with ￿0 = 2, ￿0 = 0:19286.
￿0 is chosen to make w(p) continuous at p = 0:05. For 0:05 ￿ p ￿ 0:95, the CPF is
identical to the inverse-S shaped Prelec function of Figure 1.3 (￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 1). For
0:95 < p ￿ 1, the CPF is identical to the S-shaped Prelec function, e￿￿1(￿lnp)￿1, with
￿1 = 2, ￿1 = 86:081. ￿1 is chosen to make w(p) continuous at p = 0:95.
Remark 14 (Fixed points): This CPF has ￿ve ￿xed points, p￿ = w(p￿). These are 0,
0:0055993, e￿1, 0:98845 and 1. The CPF is strictly concave for 0:05 < p < e￿1 and
0:95 < p < 1 and strictly convex for e￿1 < p < 0:95 and 0 < p < 0:05.
Remark 15 (Underweighting and overweighting of probabilities): The CPF overweights
low probabilities, in the range 0:0055993 < p < e￿1 and underweights high probabilities,
in the range e￿1 = 0:36788 < p < 0:98845. This accounts for stylized fact S1. Behavior
near p = 0, and near p = 1, is not obvious from Figure 9.1. So, Figures 9.2 and 9.3, below,
respectively magnify the regions near 0 and near 1. From Figure 9.2, we see that (9.5)
underweights very low probabilities, in the range 0 < p < 0:0055993. For p close to zero,
we see that this PWF is nearly ￿ at, thus, capturing Arrow￿ s astute observation in the
foreword to Kunreuther et al. (1978) ￿...it does appear from the data that the sensitivity







Figure 9.2: Behaviour of Figure 9.1 near 0.
goes down too rapidly as the probability decreases.￿From Figure 9.3, we see that (9.5)
overweights very high probabilities, in the range 0:98845 < p < 1. For p close to one, we
see that this PWF is nearly ￿ at.






Figure 9.3: Behaviour of Figure 9.1 near 1.
10. Composite cumulative prospect theory (CCP) and composite
rank dependent theory (CRDU)
We gave informal de￿nitions of composite prospect theory (CCP) and composite rank de-
pendent utility (RDU) in Remarks 5 and 6, which we now restate more formally.
De￿nition 18 (Composite prospect theory (CCP), al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a): Under
CCP, a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the population uses cumulative prospect theory, CP (see section
8), with its standard PWF, so lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1 (see Remark 13). This fraction conforms to S1
for non-extreme probabilities and to S2b for extreme probabilities. The remaining fraction
￿ uses CP but replaces the standard PWF with the composite Prelec probability weighting
function, CPF, de￿ned in De￿nition 17 for which lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 0 (see Result 10). This fraction
conforms to S1 for non-extreme probabilities and to S2a for extreme probabilities.
De￿nition 19 (CRDU; al-Nowaihi and Dhami, 2010a) In CRDU, RDU replaces CP in
De￿nition 18.
31Other than the probability weighting function, CP and CCP share all other elements.
The same holds true of RDU and CRDU. CCP can explain everything that CP can, which
in turn can explain everything that RDU can, which in turn can explain everything that
EU can. However, the reverse is not true. Hence, CCP is the most satisfactory theory
under risk in economics.33
10.1. The Becker paradox under CRDU
The focus of our paper is not on CRDU. Hence, we state the following remark before
focussing on CP/CCP in subsequent sections.
Remark 16 : Notice that Proposition 3 under RDU holds for any PWF w(p). In par-
ticular, it holds for the standard weighting functions such as the Prelec function, which
are used in RDU, but also the composite Prelec weighting function used in CRDU. Thus,
Proposition 3 also holds for composite rank dependent utility theory (CRDU). Therefore,
the Becker paradox survives under all versions of rank dependent utility.
11. A resolution of the Becker paradox using composite prospect
theory
The results in Section 8 show that CP cannot explain the Becker paradox in the presence
of ￿xed ￿nes F = F, which is a strong assumption. In actual practice, one observes a
punishment function F = ’(p), with some minimal desirable properties, such as substi-
tutability of the instruments, p;F, given in (2.7). Section 8 also did not incorporate recent
research on reference points. We address these issues for CP and CCP in this section. We
make three assumptions, A1-A3, in this section.
Assumption A1 (Hyperbolic Punishment function, HPF): We have already considered,
in section 2.4.2, the rationale for the HPF, F = ’(p) = b=p (see De￿nition 5).34
Assumption A2 (Heterogeneity in reference points): As in the formulation of Schmidt et
al. (2008), we allow for the reference incomes from the two activities, crime and no-crime,
to di⁄er. To enable a formulation that nests several interesting cases, we take the reference
income from crime, yc, as the expected income from crime, i.e.,
yc = y1 ￿ p’(p), (11.1)
33See al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2010a) for these claims. CCP can also incorporate the insight from third
generation prospect theory of Schmidt et al. (2008) about state dependent reference points. One may also
refer to CCP as fourth generation prospect theory.
34The HPF is optimal for a wide class of cost and damage functions. Even when the HPF is not
necessarily optimal, it provides an upper bound on punishments for a large and sensible class of cost
and damage functions. Thus, if the HPF is unable to support the Becker proposition, then the optimal
punishment functions, if di⁄erent from the HPF, cannot support the Becker proposition either.
32while the reference income from no-crime, ync, is speci￿ed as
ync = ￿yc = ￿(y1 ￿ p’(p));￿ ￿ 0. (11.2)





￿ > 1. This is the only source of individual heterogeneity in the model. For the HPF,
’(p) = b=p , and, so, using (2.1) we get that
p’(p) = b ￿ y1 ￿ y0. (11.3)
Using (11.3), the reference incomes, yc, ync, in (11.1) and (11.2) are:
yc = y1 ￿ p’(p) = y0; ync = ￿yc = ￿y0. (11.4)
The level of income from no-crime relative to the reference income from no-crime is
y0 ￿ ync = y0 ￿ ￿y0 = y0(1 ￿ ￿): (11.5)
Depending on the value of ￿, we get three important cases.
(i) Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1): In this case ￿ < 1, so from (11.5)
y0(1￿￿) > 0. Such an individual feels positively rewarded on account of his honesty.
(ii) Regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿): In this case 1 < ￿. (11.5) then implies that
y0(1￿￿) < 0. Such an individual experiences regret from not committing the crime
and having to forego the higher income from crime.
(iii) Individuals with reference income equal to the rational expectation of income (￿ =
1): The recent literature has suggested that the reference point could be the ratio-
nal expectation of income, which in this perfect foresight model equals the expected
income level.35 The expected income from no-crime is y0 while the expected in-
come from crime is y1 ￿ p’(p), which using (11.3) also equals y0. Clearly this case
corresponds to a value of ￿ = 1 in (11.4) and we get yc = ync = y0.
Assumption A3: (Power form of utility): We use the utility function in (8.2). As
already noted, this is consistent with the evidence and has axiomatic foundations.
Remark 17 : Using (11.3), y0=(y1 ￿ p’(p)) = 1. Thus ￿ ￿ 1 , ￿ < y0=(y1 ￿ p’(p))
and ￿ > 1 , ￿ ￿ y0=(y1 ￿ p’(p)).
35See, for instance, Koszegi and Rabin (2006), Crawford and Meng (2008)
33We now compute the income relative to the reference point (the source of utility under
CP and CCP) in each state for each activity. Using (11.2), for no-crime, this is
y0 ￿ ync = y0 ￿ ￿(y1 ￿ p’(p)) = y1 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ b + ￿p’(p): (11.6)
From (11.5) we know that y0 ￿ync = y0(1￿￿), but the seemingly more cumbersome form
in (11.6) will turn out to be more convenient. Now suppose that the individual chooses
the criminal activity instead. Using yc = y1 ￿p’(p) from (11.4), in the two states, caught
and not-caught, income relative to the reference point is:
￿
y1 ￿ ’(p) ￿ yc = ￿(1 ￿ p)’(p); if caught.
y1 ￿ yc = p’(p); if not caught. (11.7)
From (11.7), the income from the criminal activity relative to the reference point if ￿ not
caught￿equals the expected ￿ne p’(p) that the individual has avoided paying. This is
the elation from the criminal activity, provided one gets away with it (see De￿nition 16).
Substituting (11.6), (11.7) in the NCC (8.6) we get
w(p)v (￿(1 ￿ p)’(p)) + w(1 ￿ p)v(p’(p)) ￿ v (y1 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ b + ￿p’(p)). (11.8)





￿ w(1 ￿ p) ￿ ’(p)
￿
￿





We now use this condition to analyze the three cases: 0 ￿ ￿ < 1; ￿ = 1;1 < ￿ ￿ ￿.
11.1. Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1)
Divide through by p￿ (1 ￿ p)
￿ ’(p)















Using Remark 17, since ￿ < y0=(y1 ￿ p’(p)), so ￿ < y0=y1. Thus, an increase in ￿nes,
F = ’(p), by increasing the RHS of the NCC, deters crime. For the hyperbolic ￿ne


























We now consider separately the cases of cumulative prospect theory (CP)36 and composite
prospect theory (CCP).
36Recall that section 8 only considered CP in the special case of ￿xed reference points and ￿xed ￿nes.
34Proposition 5 (CP): Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1), who use CP are com-
pletely dissuaded from crime, i.e., the Becker proposition holds.
Proposition 5 is obvious from (11.12). Under CP, limp!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1 (see Remark 13 ),
so the NCC in (11.12) holds. A decision maker who uses CP, overweights low probabilities
to such an extent that the salience of the punishment overwhelms all other considerations,
such as the relative bene￿t from the crime. Such a decision maker is completely dissuaded
from crime by Becker-type punishments and, hence, the Becker paradox remains.
Proposition 6 (CCP): Consider socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1) who follow
CCP. A fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the these decision makers follow CP, hence, they behave as in
Proposition 5. The remaining fraction, ￿, uses the composite Prelec function, CPF. For
these individuals, the Becker proposition fails when income from crime is at least twice as
large as the income from no-crime (i.e., y1 ￿ 2y0).
From Proposition 6, a fraction 1￿￿ of socially responsible individuals are deterred from
crime by Becker-type punishments. However, the remaining fraction, ￿, is not deterred if
the income from crime is at least twice as great as the income from no-crime. For these
individuals, limp!0
w(p)
p￿ = 0 (see De￿nition 18) and, so, unlike a CP decision maker,
they place relatively low salience on the possibility of the punishment. Furthermore, they
derive elation from getting away with the act of crime (see De￿nition 16 and the discussion
following (11.7)).
Because a socially responsible individual derives grati￿cation from honesty, a higher
inducement in criminal bene￿ts is needed to commit the crime that requires y1 ￿ 2y0. In
conjunction, for the two types of decision makers under CCP, with respective fractions ￿,
1 ￿ ￿ we can explain why some individuals are deterred and others are not deterred in
the face of Becker-type punishments. Since the intuition is similar to remaining cases, we
shall be brief.
We derive even stronger results in the remaining two subsections for regretful individ-
uals and individuals with rational expectations. For such individuals, Proposition 6 holds
unconditionally, i.e., we require no restrictions on bene￿ts from crime except that b > 0.
11.2. Regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿)





￿ w(1 ￿ p) ￿ ￿￿’(p)
￿
￿





Proposition 7 (CP): Consider regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿) who follow CP: For any
of the standard probability weighting functions (for which limp!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1) under CP,
the NCC is satis￿ed and so the individual does not commit the crime
35Proposition 8 (CCP): Now suppose that the decision maker uses CCP. A fraction 1￿￿
of individuals use CP, so Proposition 7 applies to them. The Becker proposition fails for
the remaining fraction, ￿, which uses the composite Prelec function, that has the property
limp!0
w(p)
p￿ = 0 (see De￿nition 18). Thus, the Becker paradox is resolved.
11.3. The case of rational expectations (￿ = 1):
For ￿ = 1, the reference point for each activity is the expected income arising from that
activity. Thus, from Assumption A3(iii) yc = ync = y0. Thus, y0 ￿ ync = 0; while, from
(11.7), y1 ￿ yc = p’(p) and y1 ￿ ’(p) ￿ yc = ￿(1 ￿ p)’(p). Hence, the NCC (8.6) is
w(p)v (￿(1 ￿ p)’(p)) + w(1 ￿ p)v(p’(p)) ￿ 0. (11.14)
Using assumption A3 (the power form of utility), the NCC (11.14) becomes:
￿￿(1 ￿ p)
￿ ’(p)
￿ w(p) + p
￿’(p)
￿ w(1 ￿ p) ￿ 0. (11.15)






Proposition 9 (CP): Consider a decision maker who uses CP and the reference income
is the rational expectation of income. Then the Becker paradox reemerges under CP and
￿nes have no deterrent e⁄ect.
The result in Proposition 9 runs counter to one￿ s intuition for the case of individuals
with rational expectations. First, ￿nes have no deterrent e⁄ect (unlike the cases of socially
responsible and regretful individuals), which runs counter to the evidence; see, e.g., Levitt
(2004). Second, extremely small probabilities of detection eliminate crime, and so it is also
optimal to set vanishingly small ￿nes. This is also not borne out by the evidence. Hence,
the combination of standard weighting functions and rational expectations on the part of
criminals would seem not to be supported by the evidence. Proposition 10 considers the
case when decision makers use CCP, and the results conform much better to the evidence.
Proposition 10 : Suppose that the decision maker uses CCP and the reference income
is the rational expectations of income. The result in Proposition 9 applies to a fraction
1 ￿ ￿, of individuals. For the remaining fraction, ￿, the Becker paradox is solved.
In each of these alternative speci￿cations of the reference point, CCP is able to resolve
the Becker paradox but EU, RDU, CP cannot.
3612. Conclusions
The Becker proposition, summarized eloquently in Kolm￿ s (1973) phrase ￿hang o⁄enders
with probability zero￿ , is a cornerstone in the ￿ economics and law￿literature and has
provided the basis for much further development of the ￿eld. However it is often noted
that it does not hold empirically for all individuals. This, we called the Becker paradox.
A sizeable literature addresses the Becker paradox in an expected utility (EU) frame-
work. We argue that it is very di¢ cult to explain the evidence on the basis of EU. Hence,
we re-examine the Becker paradox from the perspective of alternative mainstream non-
linear decision theories. We show that the Becker paradox reemerges under rank dependent
expected utility (RDU), which, Machina (2008) describes as the most popular alternative
to the EU model. The Becker paradox also reemerges under cumulative prospect theory
(CP), the Noble prize winning work of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
At the heart of the Becker paradox, ￿hang o⁄enders with probability zero￿ , is the
behavior of individuals for low probability events. We argue that the only successful res-
olution of the Becker paradox (and we consider about 10 di⁄erent alternatives) is the one
based on al-Nowaihi and Dhami￿ s (2010a) composite cumulative prospect theory (CCP).
CCP combines prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and cumulative prospect
theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). The main insight, emerging from strong evidence,
is that while people overweight small probabilities and underweight large ones, they also
ignore extremely small probabilities and treat extremely large probabilities with near cer-
tainty.
The explanation of the Becker paradox under CCP is robust to several plausible as-
sumptions about the reference points of potential criminals. These allow us to explicitly
build-in heterogeneity among potential criminals into our analysis. We allow for ratio-
nal expectations, regret and social responsibility while considering heterogeneity issues. In
each case, so long as the decision maker is rational (as opposed to being pathological) CCP
allows the Becker paradox to be explained. The Becker paradox has been a particularly
elusive problem to explain, and the success of CCP provides independent veri￿cation of
that theory.
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3713. Appendix: Proofs of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: If ’(p) = b
p then the NCC (3.4) holds for concave u and, hence,
(a) follows. If ’(p) = b





dp = 1. Since ￿C
p > ￿C
F it
follows, from Lemma 2, that d
dpC (p;’(p)) > 0. Since crime is deterred, D(p;’(p)) = 0.
Hence, T (p;’(p)) = C (p;’(p)) which implies that d
dpT (p;’(p)) > 0. Since the objective
is to minimize T (p;’(p)), this establishes part (b). ￿.
Proof of Proposition 2: Follows from the de￿nition of umin, (7.5) and (7.6). Since
umin can be made as small as possible by raising ￿nes. In particular, if umin ! ￿1 as
Fmax ! ￿1, then pmin = 1 ￿ w￿1(1) = 0. Hence, the result follows. ￿.
Proof of Proposition 3: Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, except for the following
points: (a) ’(p) = b
1￿w(1￿p) (instead of ’(p) = b





p = 1). ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: Let the probability of detection and conviction be p > 0. Then
the NCC (8.6) can be satis￿ed by taking the punishment, F = F, to be su¢ ciently large.
￿
Proof of Proposition 5: This follows directly by substituting limp!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1 (which
holds for under CP) in (11.12). ￿
Proof of Proposition 6: Now suppose that the decision maker follows CCP. It is clear
that the fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of individuals follow CP and so the proof of Proposition 5 applies
to them. For individuals who belong to the remaining fraction ￿ (see De￿nition 18),
limp!0
w(p)
p￿ = 0. Then as p ! 0, from (11.12), we get that the NCC holds if













y0 is the bene￿t of the crime as a fraction of the no-crime income. If follows,
conversely that the NCC is not satis￿ed and so hanging o⁄enders with probability zero
does not work if







This completes the proof. ￿
Proof of Proposition 7: Divide (11.13) through by ￿p￿ (1 ￿ p)
￿ ’(p)
￿ to rewrite the















Using remark 17, we know that ￿ > y0=(y1 ￿ p’(p)), but this does not necessarily imply
that ￿ > y0=y1. If ￿ > y0=y1 then an increase in ￿nes, F = ’(p), by reducing the RHS of
38the NCC, reduces crime. Note that the RHS of (13.1) is positive and so the inequality is



















p￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿





The result now follows directly by substituting limp!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1 in (13.2).
Proof of Proposition 8: Now suppose that decision makers follow CCP. A fraction 1￿￿
uses CP and so the proof of Proposition 7 applies to them. The remaining fraction, ￿,
uses the composite Prelec function and so limp!0
w(p)
p￿ = 0 (see De￿nition 18). For these
individuals, the NCC in (13.2) implies that
￿1 ￿ ￿
￿





The RHS is positive while the LHS is negative, hence, the NCC is violated. Indeed the
decision maker will not be dissuaded from crime, i.e., the Becker proposition does not hold.
And so, the Becker paradox is resolved for these individuals. ￿
Proof of Proposition 9: Using (11.16), as the probability of detection approaches zero,














￿, the NCC (11.16) will hold with strict inequality in some non-empty





the NCC (11.16) is violated in some non-empty interval (0;p2). Hence, for punishment to
deter in this case, we must have p > p2. For any of the standard Probability weighting
functions in CP, lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1 (see Remark 13) and so the Becker paradox survives for all
individuals. ￿
Proof of Proposition 10: Now suppose that decision makers follow CCP. A fraction 1￿￿




p￿ = 0, it follows, from Proposition 9, that, for some non-empty interval (0;p2),
no level of punishment, F, no matter how large, will deter crime, if p 2 (0;p2) . ￿
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37For the Prelec weighting function, for all suitably high values of 1 ￿ p; w(1 ￿ p) < 1 ￿ p. However as
p ! 0 and so 1 ￿ p ! 1; w(1) = 1:
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